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Abstract There exists certain circularity between the formation of some epistemic atti-
tudes of an agent and the way she assesses her available arguments. For the sake of simplicity,
I will restrict my attention to the case of beliefs in what follows. The mentioned circularity
arises when one tries to embrace two principles that, taken separately, seems to be intuitively
acceptable:
1. When an agent assesses her available arguments, she should take into account her
beliefs with respect to the premises. In this sense, arguments with believed premises
should be taken to be stronger by the agent than arguments whose premises are not
believed.
2. The beliefs of an agent should be partially determined by the evaluation she performs
of her available arguments. To be more precise, if an agent is considering her doxastic
attitude towards a proposition P , then she should first assess her available arguments
about P and form her belief consequently (for instance, by believing P if her strongest
argument is in favour of P )
The tension between both principles becomes clearer when one compares works in formal
argumentation (endorsing the first one) to works in epistemic logic (endorsing the second
one). During my talk, I will propose a formal model that allows us to (consistently) endorse
some version of both principles. After that, I will explain that the epistemological view that
underlies this model corresponds to some sort of foundationalism. In this view of founda-
tionalism, we can distinguish between basic beliefs and argument-based beliefs. Within the
second class, another distinction can be drawn between strong beliefs (based on deductive
arguments) and weak beliefs (based on defeasible arguments). To conclude, I will point out
what kind of epistemic actions can change each type of beliefs.
Scientific areas of interest Epistemic Logic, Formal Argumentation, Argumentation
Theory, Formal Epistemology.
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